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1. INTRODUCTION
The strategy method (SM) has become an increasing popular way to estimate preferences.
SM consists of asking participants to indicate their choices at all information sets rather
than only those actually reached. One then compares the differences in decisions at different
information sets. For example, to identify the effect of a low offer in an ultimatum game,
one might compare the changes in decisions for the information set with the low offer versus
the decisions for the information set with the high offer. The great appeal of SM comes
from its simplicity as well as its potential to elucidate the equilibria that are actually played
when theoretical models indicate there are multiple equilibria and to circumvent many of
the endogeneity problems that arise in estimating preferences when making comparisons
between heterogeneous individuals.
Obviously, SM also has its limitations. It is appropriate when the decisions made at the
other information sets do not affect the decision made at another information set. Much of
the debate around the validity of the SM estimate typically revolves around the possibility
of emotion or cognitive fatigue when making multiple decisions.1 In psychology, a large body
of work is devoted to construal theory, which would prima facie invalidate SM estimates
(Liberman and Trope, 1998; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Trope and Liberman, 2003, 2010).2
In this paper, we address an altogether different problem with SM estimation. We put aside
the biases due to psychological factors not formalized by economic theory in estimating pref-
erences and instead focus on issues related to the economic theory underlying the estimate.
1When behavior does diverge between SM and direct elicitation (DE), researchers have suggested that DE
settings involve a different degree of emotions being present, for example, when reacting to an actual violation
of a fairness norm than when contemplating a violation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004); or individuals may be
induced to think harder in the SM setting (Casari and Cason, 2009a), spend more time making the decision
(Rand et al., 2012), or, instead, think less hard in the SM setting, and put less effort at each decision node
because they receive less monetary return per decision (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Those other papers did
not present a formal model for the divergence.
2Construal theory involves the relation between psychological distance and the extent to which people’s
thinking (e.g., about objects and events) is abstract or concrete. An example of construal level effects is
planning a summer vacation one year in advance will cause one to focus on broad features of the situation,
like fun and relaxation, while the very same vacation planned next week will cause one to focus on specific
features, like what restaurants to make reservations for. Temporal construal is believed to underly a broad
range of temporal changes in evaluation, prediction, and choice. For an economic model of focusing, see
Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013).
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Put simply, a large body of economic theory render differences in information sets in SM
and DE. The information set for a DE decision node is not the same information set for the
same decision node in SM.
We argue that when the payoffs of the game played with the strategy method are an
affine transformation of the payoffs at the induced terminal nodes in the game played with
direct elicitation, the two games are strategically equivalent, and the game played with the
strategy method essentially coincides with the strategic form of the game played with direct
elicitation. Then, if the game satisfies this one-to-one assumption3, the outcome will be
the same under the two treatments if players’ choices in the first game follow the iterated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and in the second game follow Kuhn’s algorithm.
Empirical researchers tend to rely on the behavioral validity of the strategy method (Fis-
chbacher et al., 2012). Brandts and Charness (2011, pg. 376) write that, “according to the
standard game-theoretic view, the strategy method should yield the same decisions as the
procedure involving only observed actions,” a conclusion we contend is incorrect. Roth (1995)
points out in a footnote that “the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium is lost in the tran-
sition from the extensive to the strategic form of the game, since there are no subgames in a
game in which players state their strategies simultaneously.” In this paper, we argue that the
SM estimation is in practice subject to a possibly severe economic-theoretical bias. While
economic theory of off-equilibrium motivations is frequently modeled, it implicitly assumed
away by researchers using SM estimation. Three factors make off-equilibrium motivations an
especially important issue in the SM context. First, SM estimation usually relies on many
decisions at different information sets. Second, the most commonly used dependent vari-
ables in SM estimation are typically highly related. Third, and an intrinsic aspect of the SM
estimation, the off-equilibrium decisions can affect the utility of decisions at different infor-
mation sets, even when it does not affect the monetary payoff. These three factors reinforce
each other so that the SM estimation for treatment effects could be severely biased relative
3 The one-to-one assumption suffices to solve the game in terms of payoffs, not to pin down the exact
strategies.
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to DE (which we observe in our experiments).
Motivations that are based on disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991), intentions (Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2007; Fehr and Schmidt, 2000), self-image (Bénabou and Tirole, 2011),
or duty (Chen and Schonger, 2016), to name just a few, can cause equilibrium outcomes
to differ between SM and DE. We provide a formal, general framework that embeds prior
non-formal (psychological) explanations for differences between SM and DE and show that
these explanations only hold under certain conditions in our formal model.
A different theoretical critique of SM is that the invariance of equilibrium outcomes under
consequentialist preferences relies on individuals eliminating weakly dominated strategies.
Game theorists may disagree about the actual prevalence in the field of individuals who
play weakly dominated strategies, whether because eliminating weakly dominated strategies
requires a greater level of cognition or because weakly dominated strategies may simply
be more credible than strategies eliminated through subgame perfection. Our critique is
an independent one. Our theoretical results focus on motivations (preferences), rather than
deviations from rationality in decision-making. We provide a model-based elaboration that
complements the footnote by Roth (1995). We cite a theorem from Moulin (1986, pgs. 84-86)
and Rochet (1981) that would prima facie invalidate SM.
As evidence for the relevance of the theorem, we briefly revisit prior meta-analysis and
conduct our own meta-analysis of ultimatum game experiments reported in the literature.
We chose the ultimatum game because it appears to be the game most used in the academic
literature. A google scholar search for “ultimatum game” yields roughly 22 thousand results,
“dictator game” 14 thousand, “trust game” 13 thousand, and “public goods game” 12 thou-
sand. “Prisoner’s dilemma” appears roughly 49 thousand times, but “sequential prisoner’s
dilemma” only 276. We focus mainly on the simple games, but as the previous literature has
highlighted that complexity is an important factor (Brandts and Charness, 2011), we also
consider the three-player prisoners’ dilemma (a public goods game with punishment).
In the meta-analysis, acceptance rates are 20 percentage points higher in the DE setting
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than in the SM setting. Next, we randomize whether the respondent is in SM or DE, but
not the proposer, to ensure the proposal is the same in both treatments. The DE setting
increases acceptances and is equivalent to an offer increase of 34% of endowment. Subsequent
experiments allow the proposer to also know if the responder is in the DE or SM setting.
Finally, we manipulate the salience of off-equilibrium motivations. DE increases acceptance
rates in the ultimatum game by 18 percentage points. When off-equilibrium motivations
are made salient, the difference increases to 27 percentage points. In total, we report the
results of five analyses that all demonstrate the relevance of the theorem and we do so in
the context of simple games, like the ultimatum game and trust game, and more complex
games, like the three-player prisoners’ dilemma. In the trust game, DE respondents return
three times the amount SM respondents return. In the three-player prisoners’ dilemma, DE
affects deductions of defectors.
The last two of our five analyses highlight how treatment effects can significantly differ
between SM and DE and also flip in sign. When we interpret salience as the treatment effect
of interest, we see evidence that salience has a weakly positive treatment effect under DE but
is negative under the strategy method, and the difference in treatment effects is statistically
significant at the 5% or 10% level.
We use simple models to illustrate how SM can generally differ from DE. Intuitive off-
equilibrium considerations break invariance. The upshot is not to check, under different
modeling assumptions, motivations that break invariance in every circumstance. Rather,
the degree to which off-equilibrium considerations break invariance is an empirical question.
The direction and magnitude of bias depends on the degree to which dependent variables
are related at different information sets, and in particular, how the off-equilibrium decisions
affects the utility of decisions at other information sets.
Dozens of experimental studies have investigated whether the strategy method yields the
same responses as direct elicitation where participants actually play the extensive form game.
Though a recent study concluded in favor of using SM, it reported statistically significant
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and economically important differences in behavior by elicitation method in a considerable
fraction of the studies comparing the elicitation methods: “We do find, however, that a
particular aspect of emotions-related behavior, the use of punishment, is significantly more
likely in situations with direct response than with strategy choice.” Brandts and Charness
(2011, pg. 394). In our reading, the set of games it studied divide into two: in simple games
that had moral content4, SM and DE tend to diverge, but in more complex games that
were framed as economics games5, SM and DE did not diverge or had mixed results. This
difference is consistent with the heightened relevance of off-equilibrium considerations in
social preference games. Schotter et al. (1994) presents games in extensive vs. normal form
and finds that differences emerge in the simplest games, where subjects were more likely to
use and fear incredible threats. This is consistent with our reading of the previous literature
and the interpretation whose formalization we present here.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 organizes the theoretical dis-
agreement as to whether DE and SM elicitation differs, proves that no strong consequentialist
preferences can explain these differences, and provides an example of non-consequentialist
preferences that can explain at least some DE vs. SM differences. Section 3 presents the
first study, a meta-analysis of existing papers. Section 4 presents the second study where
the ultimatum game respondent is randomized to DE or SM. Section 5 presents the third
study where DE vs. SM differences extend to another simple game, the trust game. Section 6
presents the fourth study where the ultimatum game is randomized to DE or SM and where
4These would include ultimatum games (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Guth et al., 2001; Oxoby and McLeish,
2004; Armantier, 2006; McGee and Constantinides, 2013), punishment games (Brandts and Charness, 2003;
Brosig et al., 2003; Falk et al., 2005), trust games (Murphy et al., 2006; Fong et al., 2007; Casari and Cason,
2009b; Solnick, 2007; Meidinger et al., 2001; Cox and Hall, 2010), public goods and cooperation games
(Offerman et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Mengel and Peeters, 2011; Büchner et al., 2007;
Muller et al., 2008), and prisoner dilemma/minority games (Schotter et al., 1994; Brandts and Charness,
2000; Linde et al., 2014; Reuben and Suetens, 2012).
5These would be games simulating firms (Kübler and Müller, 2002), market entry (Rapoport and Fuller,
1995; Seale and Rapoport, 2000; Sundali et al., 1995), asset pricing (Hommes et al., 2005), auction (Armantier
and Treich, 2009; Goeree et al., 2002; Rapoport and Fuller, 1995), insurance (Bosch-Doménech et al., 2006),
buying and selling games (Cason and Mui, 1998; Sonnemans, 2000), principal-agent games (Falk and Kosfeld,
2006), and negotiation games (Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993a; Rapoport et al., 1996; Rapoport and Sundali,
1996).
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off-equilibrium considerations are randomly made salient. Section 7 presents the fifth study
with a complex game, the three-player prisoners’ dilemma. Section 8 concludes.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: DIRECT ELICITATION VS. STRATEGY METHOD
2.1. Background and history
The earliest use of a “strategy method” can be found in Selten (1967), where subjects
are asked to give a strategy for the entire game instead of being only asked for decisions
and information sets that are actually reached. As Roth (1995) points out, Selten’s strategy
method first lets participants gain practice by playing the game several times, and only then
asks participants for strategies. In addition, Selten used group discussions and individual
advising of participants by the experimenter to help subjects formulate strategies in what
were quite complex games. The games used in more recent studies tend to be much simpler
than Selten’s games, usually two-player games where each player has only one move. And in
these recent studies, there is no group discussion or individual advising. Thus, currently the
strategy method is the same as Selten’s except for pre-game practice and the group discussion
and advising (for an early example, see Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993b). In both Selten’s
strategy method and the modern strategy method, subjects are made aware of an extensive
game, but instead of actually playing that game, they are asked for their (hypothetical)
decision at every decision node. Typically the game is not represented in strategic (i.e.,
matrix) form; for an exception see Schotter et al. (1994). The strategy method contrasts
with direct elicitation (also referred to as direct response method) where players are only
asked for their decisions at information sets that are actually reached. We follow convention
and sometimes refer to the strategy method as the cold setting, and direct elicitation as the
hot setting.
Formally, both the games played in the strategy method and in direct elicitation can
be represented by an extensive form game. The extensive form games differ, but the corre-
sponding normal form is the same for both methods. In that sense, they are theoretically
equivalent. There is the view that for rational players the strategic form captures all relevant
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information, and different corresponding extensive forms just differ in irrelevant representa-
tion. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) put this view nicely by writing, “In some sense, the fact
that the reduced normal form captures all the relevant information for decision purposes
results directly from the (almost tautological) fact that what matters for decision purposes
in an outcome is only the corresponding utility vector (and not, e.g., the particular history
leading to that outcome).”
In an experiment, the observable vector is a vector of monetary payoffs and may not
capture what utility players might get from feelings such as revenge, gratitude, kindness,
or warm-glow. But even from a theoretical perspective, the Kohlberg-Mertens view is not
universally accepted. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) disagree and argue that, “in general, the
solution of a game with a sequential structure simply has to depend on this sequential
structure and cannot be made dependent on the normal form only.” We show that even if
one accepts the Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) view, it cannot be used as a justification for
the strategy method of elicitation without further assumptions. The reason, in short, is that
researchers neither observe the preferences nor the players’ conception of the game, and there
are plausible circumstances where use of the strategy method rather than direct elicitation
can change players’ conception of the game. The following subsection clarifies this point, and
gives intuition for when this might occur and what it might tell us.
2.2. Failure of invariance
Consider the game in Figure 1. It is a kind of mini-ultimatum game. Player 1, the proposer,
divides an endowment of $4 between herself and player 2, the responder. She can either make
the fair offer (2, 2) or the unfair offer (3, 1). If both players are purely self-interested, the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium is (UAA′) resulting in terminal node c. In the strategic
form, shown in the left of Figure 2, that is the unique strategy profile to survive iterated
elimination of weakly strategies; thus, we have invariance.
Let us now vary the example and show how and when something like duty can break this
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Figure 1: A mini ultimatum game 
 1 
        F                            U 
  A            R                                          A‘         R‘ 
    a                            b                           c                          d 
 
2 2 
𝜋(𝑎) = (2,2)                  𝜋(𝑏) = (0,0)                 𝜋(𝑐) = (3,1)               𝜋(𝑑) = (0,0) 
 
invariance. First, let us incorporate duty in a way which does not break invariance. Assume
that whenever the responder in fact has accepted an unfair offer, that is, he responded A′
to U , he suffers a psychic loss worth α, where 0 < α < 1. One can interpret this as damage
to his honor (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996). The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of that
game is again (UAA′) resulting in terminal node c, which is also the sole surviving profile of
iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in the strategic form shown in the third
matrix of Figure 2.
Now assume a twist on that last game: The responder not only suffers a physic loss α
when he has responded A′ to U , but also when he has merely bindingly decided to do so.
If the game is elicited via the direct elicitation there is no opportunity to commit; thus, as
before, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium remains (UAA′) resulting in terminal node
c. If the game is elicited via the strategic method, then what is played is shown in the
rightmost matrix in Figure 2: Four strategy profiles survive iterated elimination of weakly
dominated strategies, and the Nash-equilibria among those are (UAA′) as before, but in
addition (FAR′). Why does this happen? Note that both (FAA′)and (FAR′) result in node
a. But in the strategic form, they now have different utilities! In strictly game theoretic
terms, this means that the reason for failure of invariance is that this strategic from cannot
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Figure 2: Strategic Form: Mini Ultimatum Games
AA′ AR′ RA′ RR′
F u(a) u(a) u(b) u(b)
U u(c) u(d) u(c) u(d)
AA′ AR′ RA′ RR′
F (2, 2) (2, 2) (0, 0) (0, 0)
U (3, 1) (0, 0) (3, 1) (0, 0)
AA′ AR′ RA′ RR′
F (2, 2) (2, 2) (0, 0) (0, 0)
U (3, 1− α) (0, 0) (3, 1− α) (0, 0)
AA′ AR′ RA′ RR′
F (2, 2− α) (2, 2) (0,−α) (0, 0)
U (3, 1− α) (0, 0) (3, 1− α) (0, 0)
represent a game tree of the form shown in Figure 1.
Thus preferences that are non-consequentialist can generate differential predictions in DE
vs. SM settings. One might call these preferences for duty or see them at least partially
as rule-based (i.e., to maintain honor). Note that with these parameters, not all self-image
concerns that incorporate off-equilibrium information break invariance (in this game). For
example, self-image concerns about a psychic gain when one has committed to accepting an
unfair offer (e.g., a turn-the-other-cheek self-image preference) would not break invariance.
Such a responder would behave like homo oeconomicus.
2.3. Invariance Example
Next, we provide another example (“tribal game”) where emotions affect decision-making,
but invariance in DE vs. SM holds.
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Figure 3: Tribal game 
 1 
        L                            H 
  K            S                                          K‘         S‘ 
    a                            b                           c                          d 
 
2 2 
𝜋(𝑎) = (1,1)                  𝜋(𝑏) = (0,2)                 𝜋(𝑐) = (1,1)               𝜋(𝑑) = (0,2) 
 
In the game in Figure 3, player 1 sends player 2 a message, where L means that she
loves ISIS and H means she hates it. Player 2 has an endowment of $2, and in response can
either be kind (K, respectively K ′) and share equally or selfish and keep all to himself (S,
respectively S ′). Thus the payoff function of Gπ is given by π(a) = π(c) = (1, 1) and π(b) =
π(d) = (0, 2). If both players are purely self-interested then the game has two subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria (LSS ′) and (HSS ′), which yield the terminal nodes b, respectively.
d, and payoff (0, 2). Elimination of weakly dominated strategies in the strategic form gives
the same equilibria.
Now consider a social preference, specifically Fehr-Schmidt preferences for player 2. In
this game, regardless of the choice of parameters for advantageous and disadvantageous
inequality, Fehr-Schmidt preferences imply that u2(b) = u2(d) > u2(a) = u2(c). Thus the
ranking of terminal nodes happens to remain unchanged and the analysis of equilibria is as
before.
Now let us construct an example where the social preference changes the equilibria: Con-
sider a very altruistic player 2 with preferences represented by u2(a) = u2(c) > u2(b) = u2(d).
A functional form from payoff vectors into utility that yields such a preference between ter-
12 DANIEL L. CHEN AND MARTIN SCHONGER
minal nodes would be, for example, u2(t) = π2(t) + απ1(t), where α > 1. The game has two
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (LKK ′) and (HKK ′), which yield the terminal nodes a,
respectively c, and payoff (1, 1). Elimination of weakly dominated strategies in the strate-
gic form gives the same equilibria. Again, there is an invariance between the extensive and
strategic forms.
Now let us change the game by changing the preference of player 2 only. Assume that he
is an avid ISIS fan, and thus prefers to be kind to someone who also claims to love ISIS, and
unkind to someone who does not. Specifically, assume that a  d  b  c, which, moreover,
means that he prefers to encounter people who profess to be fans. Note that these preferences
for player 2 are not a function of payoffs only; though π(a) = π(c) he is not indifferent
between a and c. Nevertheless, this extensive game is invariant to the method of elicitation:
The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is (Llh′) yielding the terminal node a with payoff
(not utility) (1, 1). In the strategic form, iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
gives us the same equilibrium. Note that this invariance holds even though emotions play a
role in player 2’s decisions.
The upshot, in our view, is not to check theoretically which motivations break invariance
in every circumstances, since the number of potential motivations is large. For instance,
common theoretical motivations like intentions (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Fehr and
Schmidt, 2000), disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991), and self-image (Bénabou and Tirole,
2011), to name a few, can cause divergence, but the parameters in the player’s utility function
are also unobserved. Rather, off-equilibrium considerations accepted by formal theorists and
by experimentalists can intuitively break invariance between SM and DE as we illustrate
next theoretically and empirically.
2.4. Theory
In standard game theory, one way to describe an extensive form game with perfect infor-
mation is by means of a tree Γ, a set of players {1, ..., I}, the set of nodes T , the decision
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nodes X, and set of terminal nodes Z, who plays at each decision node τ : X → {1, ..., I},
and a complete and transitive preference over the terminal nodes represented by Bernoulli
utility functions ui(a) : Z → R. Thus let G = (Γ, Ti, ui, i = 1, ..., N) describe our extensive
form game. Throughout we shall assume rationality and common knowledge.
Whether implemented in a laboratory or field setting, the preferences over terminal nodes
are not directly observable by the researcher. One then typically assigns monetary payoffs
to each terminal node, thus implementing a “game” Gπ = (Γ, Ti, πi, i = 1, ..., N), where
πi : Z → R assigns player i a payoff at every terminal node. Gπ is a game in the game-
theoretic sense with an additional assumption that all players’ preferences are purely self-
interested and this is common knowledge. We say that a player is purely self-interested if for
all terminal nodes a, b, πi(a) = πi(b) if and only if ui = ui(b). We say that a player has social
preferences where a player’s preference between two nodes is a function of their monetary
payoffs only (for all terminal nodes a, b, if π(a) = π(b) then u(a) = u(b)).6
We can denote the direct elicitation (DE) extensive form game as GDE, with extensive
form ΓDE and the corresponding Bernoulli utility functions uDEi : ZDE → R. We compare the
direct elicitation (DE), GDEπ =
(




ΓDE, uDE : ZDE → R
)
with the strategy method,GSMπ =
(




Γ SM , uSM : ZSM → R
)
.





order of players), where φ : ext. forms→ ext. forms and ζ:ZSM → ZDE (zDE associated with










. Note that uDE
and uSM are neither a design choice nor directly observable. The following chart summarizes
the theorem:
6By social preferences, here we refer to preferences like Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion preferences, but
not intentions-based preferences, which includes off-equilibrium considerations. See Sobel (2005), a literature
review that organizes a large class of behavior beyond pure self-interest.
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GDEπ =
(














GDE = (ΓDE,uDE : ZDE → RI)
Thm.
⇔
GSM = (Γ SM ,uSM : ZSM → RI)
Strategic equivalence: GDE and GSM are strategically equivalent if and only if for all
players i, there exist real numbers αi, βi > 0 such that for all












Conventional wisdom: The strategic forms of GDEπ and GSMπ are strategically equivalent.





















, then GDE and GSM are
strategically equivalent.
These results follow from Axiom 1, as formulated by Moulin (1986, pgs. 84-86):
Axiom 1 (one-to-one) A game (Γ, Ti, ui, i = 1, ..., N) satisfies the one-to-one condition if
for any terminal nodes z, z′εZ(T ) and any player i:
If ui(z) = ui(z′) then uj(z) = uj(z′) for all j = 1, .., N .
The theorem below follows the formulation of Moulin (1986, pgs. 84-86) and Rochet
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(1981):
Theorem 1 Let G = (Γ, Ti, ui, i = 1, ..., N) be an N-player game in extensive form with
perfect information satisfying the one-to-one assumption. Then the associated normal form
of G is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and the equilibrium
payoffs are the same as obtained in the extensive form by Kuhn’s algorithm.
Theorem 1 is only applicable if the payoffs given in the game are indeed the Bernoulli
utility of the players. But researchers observe the monetary payoffs, but not the Bernoulli
utility numbers of the players. The following two observations extend the applicability of the
original theorem. First note that the risk attitude of a player need not be neutral, but can
be anything:
Corollary 1 (Risk attitude) Let G = (Γ, Ti, ui, i = 1, ..., N) be an N-player game in
extensive form satisfying the one-to-one assumption. Let the domain of preferences be the
agent’s payoffs. Let preferences be a strict ordering. Then the normal form of G is solvable
by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and the equilibrium payoffs are the
same as obtained in the extensive form by Kuhn’s algorithm.
Corollary 2 (Social preferences) extends this result to social preferences:
Corollary 2 (Social preferences) Let G = (Γ, Ti, ui, i = 1, ..., N) be an N-player game
in extensive form satisfying the one-to-one assumption. Let the domain of preferences be the
vector of payoffs. Let preferences be locally non-satiated. Then, almost surely, the normal form
of G is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and the equilibrium
payoffs are the same as obtained in the extensive form by Kuhn’s algorithm.
A standard response in behavioral economics to inaccurate predictions of the homo oeco-
nomicus model is to assume richer preferences, particularly preferences that depend not only
on the agent’s own monetary payoff but also on the payoffs of others. We say that a player is
purely self-interested (homo oeconomicus) if for all terminal nodes a, b, πi(a) = πi(b) if and
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only if ui = ui(b). Social preferences is where a player’s preference between two nodes is a
function of their monetary payoffs only.7 Thus, we say that a player has social preferences if
for all terminal nodes a, b, if π(a) = π(b) then u(a) = u(b).
This subsection discusses whether such preferences can generate differential predictions
for DE vs. SM when the standard ones fail to do so. The answer is negative, and it is negative
for all strongly consequentialist preferences, which we define as follows:
Definition 1 A preference is strongly consequentialist if it depends on payoffs (agent’s
own and others’) only.
Fact If the equilibrium concept depends on the reduced normal form only, then for all
strongly consequentialist preferences the set of equilibria under direct elicitation is identical
to the set of equilibria under the strategy method.
Thus while social preferences can generate a different prediction than standard preferences
about what the equilibrium will be, each social preference creates the same equilibrium
prediction for DE and SM as long as one follows the Kohlberg-Mertens view.
7In contrast, homo oeconomicus preferences are simply the monetary payoffs. Also, by social preferences
we refer to preferences like Fehr-Schmidt preferences, but not intentions-based preferences, which will be in
a separate category.
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Notes: Green color indicates instances where DE and SM equilibria coincide (see examples
in the appendices). Red color indicates instances where equilibria may differ.
2.5. Linking Theory to Data
We can visualize the assumption behind experiments that rely on the invariance between
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Under the strategy method:




















AA′ AR′ RA′ RR′
U u(a1) u(a2) u(b1) u(b2)
F u(c1) u(d1) u(c2) u(d2)
Even more concretely, the following simplified 0-50 ultimatum game illustrates how non-
consequentialist motivations can breakdown the invariance between the strategy method
and direct elicitation when collecting data. Suppose player 2 has duty motives: If he did not
commit or in fact accept the unfair offer, he gets an additional psychic benefit of 0 < b < 10.
In the DE setting, if player 2 is offered 25 and he accepts, the utilities are (25, 25 + b). If




π(a) = (40, 10)
Accept
b





π(c) = (25, 25+b)
Accept’
d
π(d) = (0, b)
Reject’
Offer 25
AA′ x ≥ 10 RA′ x ≥ 25 AR′ RR′
p 10 (40, 10) (0, b) (40, 10) (0, b)
1− p 25 (25, 25) (25, 25 + b) (0, 0) (0, 0)
In the SM setting, the strategy, accept x ≥ 10, yields: p ∗ 10 + (1 − p) ∗ 25 = 25 − 15p
(p is the subjective belief of the responder on the choice of the proposer), while the strategy
accept x ≥ 25 yields: p ∗ (0 + b) + (1− p) ∗ (25 + b) = 25 + b− 25p. Then player 2 picks the
strategy, accept x ≥ 25, if and only if p < 0.1b. That is, player 2 only accepts high offers if
and only if there is low probability of bearing the adverse consequences of indulging in the
psychic benefit of not being a loser. If p < 0.1b, then the DE setting yields payoffs (40, 10)
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while the SM setting yields payoffs (25, 25).8
3. STUDY 1: A SURVEY OF SM VS. DE PAPERS
Whether SM has led to serious bias relative to DE in estimation in the SM vs. DE literature
so far depends on: (1) the type of decision involved, (2) the importance of off-equilibrium
considerations, and (3) whether any procedures have been used to correct for it. Since these
factors are inherently empirical, we collected data on all ultimatum game studies from the
meta-study performed in 2011 (Brandts and Charness 2011), plus studies we located on
Econlit using the keyword searches, “ultimatum game” and “minimum acceptable offer” or
“acceptance threshold.” We found 31 papers and 63 experiments.9 Data were obtained from
the authors or in some cases calculated from the graph.
We found 16 SM ultimatum games and 45 DE ultimatum games, which yields the number
of observations in Table I. Out of 16 SM games, 12 are performed with the threshold method.
Only six SM experiments reported the acceptance/rejection rate.
Next, we present evidence that behavior of the respondent diverges depending on whether
the strategy method or direct elicitation is used. The average offer is not significantly in-
fluenced by the method of elicitation (p > 0.1) and is roughly 40% of endowment (Table
I Column 1). Each observation represents one experiment and we report linear probability
models as recommended by Angrist and Pischke (2008). Offer levels are higher in the more
recent time period (p < 0.05) and lower in developing countries (p < 0.01). Controlling for
these factors do not affect the relationship between offer and method of elicitation (Column
8Note that the self-image concern b must not scale with p linearly for this statement to hold. The Kantian
categorical imperative would be an example. For a general statement about willingness to act on non-
consequentialist motivations when the decision becomes more hypothetical (e.g., in the random lottery
incentive), Chen and Schonger (2016) develops a shredding criterion for non-consequentialist motivations.
9Papers reporting DE experiments are: Bornstein and Yaniv (1998); Cameron (1999); Croson (1996);
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001); Forsythe et al. (1994); Gneezy and Guth (2003); Güth et al. (1982); Henrich
(2000); Henrich and McElreath (2001); Hoffman and Smith (1994); Hoffman et al. (1996); Ruffle (1998);
Slembeck (1999); Slonim and Roth (1998); Suleiman (1996); Weg and Smith (1993); Roth et al. (1991);
Anderson et al. (2000); Oxoby and McLeish (2004). Papers reporting SM experiments are: Andreoni et al.
(2003); Blount (1995); Carter and Irons (1991); Harrison and McCabe (1996); Munier and Zaharia (2002);
Solnick and Schweitzer (1999); Solnick (2001); Oxoby and McLeish (2004); Ong et al. (2012); Brañas-Garza
et al. (2006); Poulsen and Tan (2007); Schmitt et al. (2008); Güth et al. (1997). Some papers reported
multiple experiments.
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TABLE I
Offer levels in ultimatum game meta-analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Intercept) 0.412*** -7.079* 0.402*** 0.415***
(0.00814) (3.209) (0.00813) (0.00751)
Strategy method 0.0136 -0.0187 0.0133 0.00245
(0.0159) (0.0173) (0.0352) (0.0140)






Mean of Y 0.416 0.416 0.403 0.415
N 61 61 61 60
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: Column 1 has no controls, Column 2 controls for year of experiment, whether the
experiment was conducted repeatedly, and whether the study was conducted in a
developing country. Column 3 weights by citation counts for the paper. Column 4 weights
by the number of observations in the study.
2). The lack of an effect is robust to weighting for the study’s citation count (Column 3)
or the study’s number of observations (Column 4). A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test cannot
reject the null of equality of offers (p = 0.59).
Direct elicitation increases acceptance rate of the responder by roughly 20 percentage
points (p < 0.001) (Table II Column 1). This increase is robust to controls for offered
amount, whether the experiment is repeated, and whether the study is in a developing coun-
try (Column 2). Repeating the experiment reduces acceptance rate by 12 percentage points
(p < 0.001) (Column 2). Like SM, repeating the experiment may involve decisions at one
information set affecting the utility-but not the payoffs-of decisions at another information
set.
When the interaction between offer and SM is included, offers increase acceptance in
SM (p < 0.1) (Column 3): an additional 1 percentage point in offer is associated with an
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TABLE II
Acceptance rate in ultimatum game meta-analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.877*** 0.768*** 0.823*** 0.549** 0.788*** 0.696***
(0.0183) (0.134) (0.133) (0.197) (0.0915) (0.111)
Strategy method -0.198*** -0.208*** -1.205* -0.933+ -0.0943 -0.103**
(0.0528) (0.0507) (0.535) (0.518) (0.122) (0.0357)
Offer level 0.399 0.264 0.900+ 0.291 0.554*
(0.306) (0.306) (0.451) (0.225) (0.267)
Repeated experiment -0.120*** -0.114** -0.113** -0.138*** -0.125***
(0.0337) (0.0330) (0.0352) (0.0300) (0.0272)
Developing country -0.0241 -0.0278
(0.0381) (0.0372)
Strategy Method X Offer 2.507+ 1.874
(1.338) (1.288)
Mean of Y 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.841 0.860 0.867
N 50 50 50 33 50 49
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: Column 1 has no controls, Column 2 controls for year of experiment, whether the
experiment was conducted repeatedly, and whether the study was conducted in a
developing country. Column 3 adds the interaction between strategy method and offer level.
Column 4 does the same but drops developing countries. Column 5 weights by citation
counts for the paper. Column 6 weights by the number of observations in the study.
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additional 2.5 percentage points in acceptance rate when SM is used than when DE is used.
When we drop developing countries (all of which used direct elicitation), DE still increases
acceptance rates (p < 0.1) (Column 4). Furthermore, a significant effect of offers emerges:
an additional 1 percentage point in offer is associated with an additional 0.9 percentage
points in acceptance rate when DE is used (p < 0.1); SM yields an insignificant greater 1.9
percentage points in acceptance rate per 1 percentage point in offer (p > 0.1).
Removing interaction terms, but weighting by citation counts renders the main effect of
DE vs. SM insignificant (Column 5). Weighting by the number of observations yields an effect
of 10 percentage points (p < 0.01) (Column 6). In sum, we observe that the behavior of the
respondent diverges depending on whether SM or DE is used, especially the acceptance rate.
In addition, among the 16 SM experiments, six report the acceptance/rejection rate along
with average threshold, nine report average threshold only (rendering the acceptance data
unusable for Table II), and one reports nothing for the responder (also rendering the data
unusable). The six SM studies reporting acceptance rates have a somewhat lower average
threshold than the nine studies reporting thresholds only. This suggests that if these nine
studies also reported acceptance rates, the nine studies would have had lower acceptance
rates than the six studies reporting both. In this case, the effect of DE increasing acceptance
rates would be larger and more significant. Appendix A shows a CDF of the rejection rate
study by study, which shows that the SM first-order stochastically dominates the results
from the DE studies. Still, since these studies may have idiosyncratic differences in design
and did not necessarily randomize whether subjects experienced SM or DE, we next turn to
our own experiments.
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4. STUDY 2: ULTIMATUM GAME - DE VS. SM FOR RESPONDENT
4.1. Design
Study 2 used MTurk. We first asked MTurk subjects to transcribe three paragraphs of
text10 to reduce the likelihood of their dropping from the study after seeing treatment,
a technique to minimize differential attrition that may affect causal inference when using
MTurk subjects (Chen and Yeh 2010; Chen et al. 2017; Chen 2012; Chen and Horton 2016).11
After the lock-in task, subjects have an opportunity to split with the recipient a 50 cent bonus
(separate from the payment they received for data entry), up to 23 times the expected wage.12
We had 156 subjects split evenly between the role of proposer and respondent and between
strategy method and direct elicitation (2x2 design). Instructions are in Appendix C.
In the ultimatum game (Figure B.1), the proposer proposed a split of $0.50 between herself
and the responder, in increments of $0.05. In the direct elicitation treatment, the responder
was informed about the amount offered and asked whether she accepts or rejects the offer
(Figure B.2). If the offer was accepted, both players received the payoff according to the split
proposed by the proposer. If the offer was rejected, both players received zero payoff. In the
strategy method treatment, the responder indicated whether she would accept or reject each
possible offer without knowing the actual offer. If the responder rejected the offer actually
10A sample paragraph of data entry was a Tagalog translation of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations:
Kaya sa isip o diwa na tayo ay sa mga ito, excites ilang mga antas ng parehong damdamin, sa proporsyon
ng kasiglahan o dulness ng kuru-kuro.Ang labis na kung saan sila magbuntis sa kahirapan ng mga wretches
nakakaapekto sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga sarili ng higit pa sa anumang iba pang; dahil sa takot
na arises mula sa kathang isip nila kung ano ang kani-kanilang mga sarili ay magtiis, kung sila ay talagang
ang wretches kanino sila ay naghahanap sa, at kung sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga sarili ay talagang
apektado sa parehong miserable paraan. Ang tunay na puwersa ng mga kuru-kuro na ito ay sapat na, sa
kanilang mga masasaktin frame, upang gumawa ng na galis o hindi mapalagay damdam complained ng.
11This task was sufficiently tedious that no one was likely to do it “for fun,” and it was sufficiently simple
that all participants could do the task. The source text was machine-translated to prevent subjects from
finding the text elsewhere on the Internet.
12A paragraph takes about 100 seconds to enter so a payment of 10 cents per paragraph is equiv-
alent to $86.40 per day. The current federal minimum wage in the Unites States is $58/day. In
India, payment rate depends on the type of work done, although the "floor" for data entry po-
sitions appears to be about $6.38/day (Payscale, Salary Snapshot for Data Entry Operator Jobs,
http://www.payscale.com/research/IN/Job=Data_Entry-_Operator/Salary?, accessed June 17, 2011). In
one data entry study, one worker emailed saying that $0.10 was too high and that the typical payment
for this sort of data entry was $0.03 cents per paragraph. Our study involves $0.20 for a comparable task:
reading essentially a single paragraph and making 1 decision, with an additional $0.50 possible.
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made by the proposer, neither player received any bonus. The responder’s behavior can be
characterized by a rejection threshold, the minimum offer the responder is willing to accept
(Figure B.3). The proposer did not know the method of elicitation for the responder in order
to hold proposer’s decisions constant. We are interested in the average treatment effect of
DE vs. SM on the responder.
4.2. Results
Table III regresses an indicator for whether or not the ultimatum game offer was accepted
on the treatment indicator, SM, using a linear probability model. Results are robust to
using a probit specification. While there were 20 percentage points fewer acceptances in
the strategy method (p < 0.1) (Column 1), the effect becomes 22 percentage points and
more significant (p < 0.05) when controlling for the amount offered (Column 2).13 For each
additional $0.01 offered, the acceptance rate increases by 2 percentage points (p < 0.001).
In terms of magnitude, direct elicitation is equivalent to an additional 17 cents offer in a
0-50 ultimatum game, or roughly 34% of endowment. Including an interaction between offer
and SM yields a significantly greater association of 1.7 percentage points acceptance rate
per $0.01 offer amount (p < 0.1) (Column 3), which is analogous to what was found in the
survey of prior literature in Study 1.
5. STUDY 3: TRUST GAME - DE VS. SM FOR RESPONDENT
5.1. Design
In Study 3, we examine another canonical game, the trust game, also on MTurk. The
recruitment procedure was the same as in Study 2. We had 94 subjects split evenly between
the role of proposer and respondent and between strategy method and direct elicitation (2x2
design). In the trust game, the proposer receives $0.50 and chooses how much to transfer to
13To put this in perspective, Oosterbeek et al. (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of 66 studies and found
that the strategy method reduced acceptance rates by 13%.
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TABLE III
Ultimatum game offer acceptance
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) 0.917*** 0.543*** 0.784***
(0.0467) (0.126) (0.214)
Strategy method -0.202* -0.223** -0.629*
(0.0846) (0.0817) (0.268)
Offer level 0.0155*** 0.00552
(0.00453) (0.00814)
Strategy x Offer level 0.0165+
(0.00960)
Mean of Y 0.808 0.808 0.808
N 78 78 78
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: This table examines the determinants of whether the ultimatum game offer is
accepted by the second player. Column (1) shows the raw correlation between acceptance
and the treatment indicator (strategy method decision-making). Column (2) also controls
for amount offered by the first player. Column (3) examines whether treatment affects the
relationship between acceptance and amount offered.
the responder, in increments of $0.10 (Figure B.4). Any money transferred by proposer is
tripled. Responder then chooses how much to return to the proposer. In DE, she is informed
about the amount transferred and decides how much should be given back. In SM, she is
asked to indicate how much she would return for every possible amount transferred using the
strategy method (Figure B.5). Proposer’s transfer can be considered a measure of trust, while
responder’s return-transfer can be considered a measure of trustworthiness. Instructions are
in Appendix B.
5.2. Results
In Figure 4, we plot the relationship between amount offered by the proposer and the
amount returned by the responder. We can see that the relationship is more intense in the
DE (hot) setting.
A linear probability model indicates that respondents return $0.66 for each $1.00 that
is offered in the SM setting, but they return $1.85 for each $1.00 offered in the DE setting
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Figure 4:
Each point represents an amount offered and amount returned in the trust game. Red dots
indicate SM scenarios while blue dots indicate DE scenarios.
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(p < 0.05).
6. STUDY 4: ULTIMATUM GAME - DE VS. SM AND LOW VS. HIGH SALIENCE
6.1. Design
We chose to run our remaining studies in the lab, which may be a more controlled setting
than MTurk. In Study 4, we ran the lab experiment at the MaXLab following their standard
procedures in Magdeburg and used oTree (Chen et al., 2016). We collected data on 418
subjects across 16 experimental sessions. Instructions are in Appendix B. In Study 4, the
proposer knows the method of elicitation for the responder, so we examine and control for
the offer. The endowment was €1.00, with stakes about twice that of Study 2 for a similar
amount of reading. Roughly 70 participants were in each of six treatments (3x2 design), listed
as follows with abbreviations in parentheses: Direct elicitation (DE) / strategy method (SM)
/ threshold method (SM-Th) x neutral (neu) / emotional (emo).
We introduce two variants of SM. In one variant, subjects report the threshold (where
the responder had to state the minimum level of the offer that she would accept), and in
another, they report their strategy (where the responder had to decide whether she would
accept every theoretical offer that could be made by the proposer before the actual offer
was revealed).14 We also introduced a cross-cutting treatment to increase the salience of off-
equilibrium payoffs (for a total of six possible groups, two emotional settings x three game
variants). In the high salience treatment, the experiment changed two words: proposer →
dictator and respondent → subject. The intervention involves only these two words. If SM
vs. DE invariance is affected by a few words, the basis for using SM instead of DE would
seem fragile.
14Some may argue that the threshold method is sufficient to capture SM, but many experimental studies
document that subjects may have multiple switches when presented with the full strategy method.
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Figure 5: Ultimatum game: Average offer levels for different treatments with 95% confidence
intervals.
6.2. Results
We cannot reject the null that the proposer’s offer is the same across treatments (see
Figure 5). Offers are slightly lower in DE than in SM, which is consistent with proposers
being aware that responders are more likely to accept in DE. In Oosterbeek et al. (2004)’s
meta-analysis of 66 studies, offered shares were significantly lower with DE by 2% (p < 0.1).
Figure 6 reports the natural pattern in ultimatum games: Acceptances are positively
associated with the offered amount regardless of treatment. In Column 1, DE shows one
observation per subject-pair. In Columns 2 and 3, SM and SM-Th show all possible obser-
vations per subject-pair. For the threshold method, we generate an acceptance or rejection
for every possible offer. The display is intentionally saturated to illustrate the standard data
analysis with SM.
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Figure 6: Ultimatum Game in laboratory: Acceptances and rejections for different offer levels
and different treatments.
Figure 7 shows that DE results in more acceptances, similar to the survey of prior literature
and to our other experiment. In particular, the increase in acceptance is visible in both the low
salience (neu) and high salience settings (emo). Increases in acceptance rates under DE are
somewhat larger in the high salience setting, which suggests that salience of off-equilibrium
considerations may drive some of the differences between DE and SM.15 Notably, equilibrium
behavior does not diverge between the strategy (SM) and threshold (SM-Th) methods.
We next examine these relationships in regression analysis. We create indicator variables
for every treatment and their interaction: direct elicitation (DE) / strategy method (SM) /
threshold method (SM-Th) x neutral (neu) / emotional (emo) (Table IV, Column 1). We
include a control for offer level in Column 2 and interactions of offer level and treatment
indicators in Column 3.
15Regression analyses indicate statistical significance level just shy of 10%.
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Figure 7: Ultimatum Game in laboratory: Acceptance ratio for different treatments with
95% confidence intervals.
We begin with a large sample size for illustrative purposes, but later restrict to one
observation per subject-pair. The fact that the proposer makes slightly lower offers in DE
means that restricting to one outcome would lead to the erroneous conclusion of higher
acceptances in SM.16 Indeed, comparing Columns 1 and 2 show that the difference between
SM and DE almost doubles from 9.6 percentage points higher acceptance rate in DE (p <
0.05) to 16.2 percentage points (p < 0.001) once the offer level is controlled for. This doubling
did not occur in Study 2 when offer was added as a control, as the offerer in Study 2 was
unaware of the respondent’s method of elicitation. Note that the high salience treatment
further increases the difference in acceptance rates by 9 percentage points (p < 0.1) (Column
2). Here, we see that the “Emotions” treatment has significant interaction with the full
strategy method rather than with the threshold method. If we interpret salience as the
treatment effect of interest, we see evidence that salience has no significant treatment effect
16Note that this was not necessary in the online experiment since the proposer did not know whether the
responder was in DE or SM.
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but is weakly positive under DE but appears weakly negative under the full strategy method,
and the difference in treatment effects is statistically significant at the 10% level.
Since the strategy and threshold methods both involve off-equilibrium considerations and
render similar results17, we pool these treatments in Table V. Columns 1 and 2 confirm the
lower acceptance rate in SM of 12 percentage points (p < 0.05) and 18 percentage points
(p < 0.001) respectively. When we control for offer level (Column 2), this difference is highly
significant. In Column 3, fully interacting offer with the treatments shows that while 1%
of offer is associated with 24 percentage points higher acceptance rates (p < 0.001), SM
reduces this association by 14 percentage points (p < 0.01) in the low salience setting. This
interaction differs from the previous experiment and literature. The main result remains that
behavior in DE and SM diverges rather than stay invariant.
We can visualize the different correspondence between acceptance rates and offer level for
DE and SM in Figure 8. DE responders are more sensitive to offers (the regression line for
the raw data is red), more than twice as sensitive than for SM responders. This is true for
both the low and high salience settings.
In sum, DE responders are 18 percentage points more likely to accept than SM responders
in the low salience setting and are 27 percentage points more likely to accept in the high
salience setting (Table V Column 2). Column 3 echoes Figure 8 as the coefficient on the
interaction term of Strategy and Offer level suggests that differences between DE and SM
responders grows with the offer level.
One concern with the aforementioned analyses is that strategy/threshold provides far
more data at offer levels that are off-equilibrium or rare. Discarding data for offers other
than 40% or 50% (these offers occur over 80% of the time) still yields divergence between
17The coefficient on Threshold in Columns 1 and 2 of Table IV suggest that SM-Th renders 4.3 percentage
points lower acceptance rate than SM (p < 0.1, p < 0.01).
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TABLE IV
Acceptance rates in laboratory ultimatum game
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) 0.824*** 0.248*** -0.488+
(0.0463) (0.0406) (0.284)
Strategy method -0.0963* -0.162*** 0.625*
(0.0490) (0.0410) (0.286)
Threshold method -0.0434+ -0.0434** -0.0943*
(0.0235) (0.0165) (0.0399)
Emotions 0.0684 0.0659 0.355
(0.0587) (0.0498) (0.325)
Strategy x Emotions -0.0928 -0.0903+ -0.427
(0.0632) (0.0523) (0.327)
Threshold x Emotions 0.00291 0.00291 0.00789
(0.0336) (0.0229) (0.0545)
Offer level 0.107*** 0.244***
(0.00159) (0.0488)
Strategy x Offer level -0.145**
(0.0489)
Threshold x Offer level 0.00848+
(0.00465)
Emotions x Offer level -0.0541
(0.0547)
Strategy x Emo x Offer 0.0620
(0.0549)
Threshold x Emo x Offer -0.000830
(0.00634)
Mean of Y 0.702 0.702 0.702
N 3156 3156 3156
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: This table reports regression results for acceptance rate. The threshold method is
treated as a subset of strategy method, (i.e., the strategy dummy is set to 1 also for
threshold method observations).
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TABLE V
Acceptance rates in laboratory ultimatum game
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) 0.824∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ -0.488
(0.0463) (0.0406) (0.284)
Strategy method -0.117∗ -0.184∗∗∗ 0.579∗
(0.0477) (0.0402) (0.285)
Emotions 0.0684 0.0659 0.355
(0.0587) (0.0497) (0.325)
Strategy x Emotions -0.0923 -0.0898 -0.425
(0.0610) (0.0510) (0.326)
Offer level 0.107∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.00159) (0.0488)
Strategy x Offer level -0.141∗∗
(0.0488)
Emotions x Offer level -0.0541
(0.0547)
Strategy x Emo x Offer 0.0618
(0.0548)
Mean of Y 0.702 0.702 0.702
N 3156 3156 3156
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: This table reports regression results for acceptance rate. Strategy method and
Threshold method are pooled together.
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Figure 8: Ultimatum Game in laboratory: Acceptance at different offer levels for direct
elicitation and strategy method (pooled with threshold method).
SM and DE (Figure 9). Focusing only on 40% offers with one observation per subject-pair,
renders 100% acceptance in DE but significantly lower acceptance in SM.18
7. STUDY 5: THREE-PLAYER PRISONERS’ DILEMMA - DE VS. SM AND LOW VS. HIGH
SALIENCE
7.1. Design
In Study 5, we ran the lab experiment at the WiSo-Experimentallabor lab19 following
their standard procedures in Hamburg and used oTree (Chen et al., 2016). We collected data
from 585 participants across 24 sessions. Subjects play the three-player prisoners’ dilemma.
We chose a more complex game because previous studies suggested differences between SM
and DE may depend on the complexity of the game. In this game, participants were divided
18High salience of off-equilibrium considerations further reduce the willingness for responders to accept
low offers in the threshold setting.
19We used a different lab because of the number of subjects we needed.
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Figure 9: Ultimatum Game in laboratory: Acceptance at different offer levels for direct
elicitation, strategy method, and threshold method. Low offer level is 40% and high offer
level is 50% of the endowment.
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into groups of three. The identities of the other players were never revealed. Each player was
endowed 100 points (which were later converted into cents, 5 points = 1 cent). In the first
stage, they had to decide whether to contribute 20 points to a common investment project.
The payoff was the sum of retained points, either 80 or 100–plus the payoff from the project–
which was defined as 0.6 * total amount of contributions. Thus, if everyone contributed, the
payoff from the project was 36 (0.6 * 3 * 20). But if only one player contributed, the project
payoff would be 12, and the contributor is left with 92 points (80 + 0.6 * 20), while the two
non-contributing players end the first stage with 112 points each (100 + 0.6 * 20).
In the second stage, each player can deduct up to 21 points from each of the other
players. However, any deduction is also applied to the deducting player. For example, when
a player deducts 10 points from another player, her own payoff is also deducted by 10 points.
Deductions can be contingent on the behavior of the other players in the first stage. In the
direct elicitation setting, players are informed about the behavior of other players in the first
stage before choosing the deductions.
In the strategy method setting, players are not informed about the first stage results, but
are asked to decide hypothetically what to deduct in each possible outcome of the first stage
(when the two other players contribute, when the two other players defect, and when one
defects and one contributes). Thus, in total, in the SM setting, each player reports four
possible deductions. After the decision is made, the action of other players (but not their
identity) is revealed and the final payoffs are calculated.
Finally, we again implement a cross-cutting randomization of high vs. low salience for a
total of four treatments (SM vs. DE x emo- vs. neutral). As in Study 4, we designed the
salience treatment to avoid framing effects. To manipulate salience, the experiment changed
one word: group → team, and changed the background color: purple→ red, when describing
the game. The setting with group and purple is coded as Emotions = 0 and the setting with
team and red is coded as Emotions = 1 in the data analysis. In color psychology, red tends to
lead to feelings of excitement, while purple tends to calm (Valdez and Mehrabian, 1994; Elliot
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and Maier, 2014). A team is typically perceived as a group with a common team purpose.
Again, if invariance between SM and DE is affected by a few words or background color, the
basis for using SM instead of DE would seem fragile. Instructions are in the Appendix B.
Participants are assigned to matches with three players each. In brief, as in the ultimatum
game, DE responders were more cooperative than SM responders. They were less willing to
punish non-cooperative first-stage behavior. Differences between DE and SM were affected
by salience. We find similar results when we control for the first-stage outcome, restrict the




Figure 10 presents the number of contributors across different treatments. Across all four
treatments, between 80-90% of groups had two or more contributors.
Table VI reports regression analyses, which yield statistically insignificant differences in
the probability of contribution (Column 1) and the number of contributors (Columns 2 and
3).
Figure 11 shows deductions. Deductions are larger for defectors than for contributors.
Defectors are punished more when one of the other players contributes.
The action of the deductor in the first stage also matters. Defectors deduct less than
contributors (Figure 12).
Figure 13 reports the average treatment effects. SM subjects deduct more, but this figure
is slightly misleading because SM asks players to specify all potential deductions, whereas
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Figure 10: Three-Player Prisoners’ Dilemma: Number of contributors per match for different
treatments.
TABLE VI
Contributions in Three-Player Prisoners’ Dilemma
Contribution rate No. of contributors No. contr (ordered probit)
(Intercept) 0.740*** 2.220***
(0.0397) (0.0648)
Strategy method 0.00715 0.0215 0.0301
(0.0522) (0.0853) (0.132)
Emotions 0.0268 0.0805 0.135
(0.0527) (0.0896) (0.141)
Strategy x Emotions -0.00511 -0.0153 -0.0360
(0.0717) (0.118) (0.186)
Mean of Y 0.756 2.268 2.268
N 586 586 586
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: Contribution rate and number of contributors per match explained by treatment
dummies. Column (3) contains estimates of an ordered probit model.
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Figure 11: Three-Player Prisoners’ Dilemma: Average deduction to different receivers for
different treatments.
Notes: DD represents a deduction to both defectors, CC represents a deduction to both
contributors. In a situation when one player contributes and the other defects, D1
represents a deduction to a defector and C1 to a contributor.
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Figure 12: Three-Player Prisoners’ Dilemma: Average deductions for different treatments
depending on whether deducting player was a contributor or defector.
in DE, players specify only deductions in realized nodes. Since scenarios with two or more
defectors are rare in DE, we observe larger average deductions in SM, when we do not
condition on the type of receiver.
Figure 11 examines deductions by type of receiver. The third column in each set of four in
this figure is of interest - it shows the deduction applied to defectors when there is 1 defector,
as roughly 40% of the time, there is only 1 defector and the punisher is a contributor. SM
subjects deduct more. Thus, less acceptance of non-cooperative behavior is observed in SM
in both the ultimatum game and the three-player prisoners’ dilemma. We next examine the
interaction with salience. Figures 13 and 14 report the aggregate effects of salience: differences
between SM and DE emerge depending on salience.
Table VII shows that subjects in SM made 1.1 points larger deductions (p < 0.001) and
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Figure 13: Three-Player Prisoners’ Dilemma: Average deductions for different treatments
Figure 14: Three-Player Prisoners’ Dilemma: Average positive deductions for different treat-
ments (observations with deduction being zero excluded)
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TABLE VII
Deductions in Three-Player Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Deduction level Deduction probability Non-zero deduction level
(Intercept) 0.376 0.0983*** 3.824*
(0.294) (0.0271) (1.521)
Strategy method 1.129*** 0.0569+ 5.875***
(0.330) (0.0304) (1.642)
Emotions 0.317 0.000744 3.176
(0.400) (0.0369) (2.069)
Strategy x Emotions -0.403 0.0210 -4.856*
(0.456) (0.0421) (2.245)
Mean of Y 1.253 0.150 8.352
N 1627 1627 244
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) use the entire sample; Column (3) examines positive
deductions only.
were 5.7 percentage points more likely to deduct (p < 0.1) in the group salience setting
(Columns 1 and 2). Restricting to non-zero deductions, salience significantly affects the
difference between DE and SM by 4.9 points (p < 0.05) (Table VII Column 3). In terms of
magnitudes, salience is roughly equivalent to the entire difference between SM and DE. SM
subjects in the group salience setting made 5.9 points larger deductions (p < 0.001). To put
this in perspective, like in Study 4, if we interpret salience as the treatment effect of interest,
we see evidence that salience has no significant treatment effect but is weakly positive under
DE but appears weakly negative under the strategy method, and the difference in treatment
effects is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Similar results emerge when we control for the first stage outcome or restrict the sample
to specific first stage outcomes, that is, restrict the sample to one observation per subject-
first stage outcome. Table VIII restricts to contributors making the decision to deduct when
the first stage resulted in exactly one defector and exactly two contributors (including the
subject). Defectors received 3.1 points more deduction (p < 0.001) and were 34 percentage
points more likely to have a deduction (p < 0.001) (Columns 1 and 2). SM subjects made 1.3
INVARIANCE OF EQUILIBRIUM TO THE STRATEGY METHOD 43
TABLE VIII
Deduction level regression for a subsample: only observations for people who
contributed with deductions made towards the only other contributor or the only
defector.
Deduction level Deduction probability Non-zero deduction level
(Intercept) -0.772 0.0235 2.085
(0.546) (0.0469) (2.258)
Strategy method 1.345* 0.00717 6.383**
(0.587) (0.0504) (1.919)
Emotions 0.371 -0.0194 2.406
(0.712) (0.0612) (2.399)
Strategy x Emotions -0.371 0.0789 -4.691+
(0.819) (0.0703) (2.697)
Receiver is defector 3.128*** 0.342*** 2.317
(0.351) (0.0301) (1.742)
Mean of Y 1.858 0.219 8.489
N 626 626 137
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
points larger deductions (p < 0.05) in the group salience setting (Column 1), equivalent to
roughly 40% of the effect of being a sole defector. Restricting to non-zero deductions, salience
significantly affects the difference between DE and SM by 4.7 points (p < 0.1) (Column 3).
In terms of magnitudes, salience is roughly 70% of the entire difference between SM and DE.
SM subjects in the group salience setting made 6.4 points larger deductions (p < 0.01). If we
interpret salience as the treatment effect of interest, we again see evidence that salience has
no significant treatment effect but is weakly positive under DE but appears weakly negative
under the strategy method, and the difference in treatment effects is statistically significant
at the 10% level.
Other models also yield significant differences between SM and DE. Table IX controls
for the status of the deductor (contributor or defector) and for the first stage outcome
(two defectors, one defector, or none). As noted from the figures, contributors deduct more
(p < 0.001), by 1.2 points, and defectors get more deductions, 1.6 points more when defecting
as a pair (p < 0.001) and 2.4 points more when defecting singly (p < 0.001). SM subjects
deduct 0.9 points more in the group salience setting (p < 0.01), roughly equivalent to being
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TABLE IX
Full sample, controlling for effect of contribution status and for the receiver of the
deduction, but no interactions of these controls with emotions or strategy method
dummy.
Deduction level Deduction probability Non-zero deduction level
(Intercept) -1.225*** -0.0825** 0.855
(0.347) (0.0312) (2.398)
Strategy method 0.880** 0.0290 6.089***
(0.319) (0.0287) (1.681)
Emotions 0.347 0.00415 3.290
(0.383) (0.0345) (2.073)
Strategy x Emotions -0.458 0.0148 -5.186*
(0.436) (0.0393) (2.261)
To the only contributor -0.0249 0.000368 -0.193
(0.250) (0.0225) (2.020)
To the only defector 2.387*** 0.268*** 1.776
(0.250) (0.0225) (1.541)
To two defectors 1.555*** 0.175*** 1.357
(0.273) (0.0246) (1.644)
Contributor 1.165*** 0.131*** 1.658
(0.213) (0.0192) (1.544)
Mean of Y 1.253 0.150 8.352
N 1627 1627 244
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
a contributor (Column 1). Restricting to non-zero deductions, significant differences between
DE and SM emerge depending on salience (p < 0.05) (Column 3). In terms of magnitudes,
salience is roughly equivalent to the entire difference between SM and DE. SM subjects in
the group salience setting made 6.1 points larger deductions than DE subjects (p < 0.001).
To say it another way, salience has no significant treatment effect but is weakly positive
under DE but is weakly negative under the strategy method, and the difference in treatment
effects is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table X fully interacts all possible first stage outcomes and saturates them as controls.
Analogous to the other results, contributors deduct 2.5 points more (p < 0.001) (Column
1) and are 18 percentage points more likely to deduct (p < 0.01) (Column 2). Defectors get
deducted 2 points more (p < 0.001) (Column 1) and are 22 percentage points more likely to
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TABLE X
Regression with all the possible outcomes of first stage dummied (contribution status
and the number of all contributors in the group).
Deduction level Deduction probability
(Intercept) -1.460 -0.1000
(0.913) (0.0829)




Strategy x Emotions -0.472 0.0146
(0.442) (0.0401)




No of contr = 1 0.214 0.0165
(0.923) (0.0838)
No of contr = 2 0.562 0.0537
(0.893) (0.0810)
Contributor X No of contr = 2 -1.649* -0.0551
(0.675) (0.0613)
No of contr = 3 -0.817 -0.0113
(1.065) (0.0967)
Mean of Y 1.253 0.150
N 1627 1627
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
be deducted (p < 0.001) (Column 2). Contributors deduct less by 1.6 points when everyone
contributed (p < 0.05) (Column 1). Notably, SM subjects deduct 1.2 points more in the
group salience setting (p < 0.001) (Column 1) and are 6 percentage points more likely to
deduct (p < 0.05), equivalent to a large fraction of the deduction to defectors.
Based on previous experiments and our own experiments, we have reviewed the perfor-
mance of DE vs. SM for preference elicitation. The results we obtain are in accord with
the previous literature and across our four experiments. First, not accounting for the bias
in the estimation when decisions at one information set can influence the utility at another
information set can render significant differences in decision-making. Second, the bias can
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be large and equivalent to some of the other treatment effects being measured. Third, subtle
interventions on salience can magnify differences between strategy method and direct elici-
tation by a large amount, and if we interpret salience as the treatment of interest, we present
evidence that the sign of the treatment flips between the two elicitation methods and flips
significantly.
8. CONCLUSION
Our study suggests that, because of off-equilibrium motivations, conventional SM esti-
mates may be grossly biased, leading to misleading treatment effects relative to DE. Since
a large fraction of SM papers rely on many decisions at different information sets that are
typically highly related, the off-equilibrium decisions can affect the utility of decisions at
different information sets, even when it does not affect the monetary payoff. These factors
reinforce each other so that the SM estimation for treatment effects could be severely biased.
Theoretically, SM estimation may be positively or negatively biased away from DE depend-
ing on how utility interacts with decisions at other information sets. We leave empirical
exploration of positive and negative bias for future work.
We have illustrated with simple models of off-equilibrium motivations in the SM context.
Differences between DE and SM can reveal the importance of motivations beyond strong
consequentialist ones. An alternative to the view of natural field experiments (a subset of
DE) as the gold standard for causal estimates (Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List,
2007), is that differences between SM and DE can be used to understand the general way in
which agents’ motivations influence behavior (Camerer, 2011). To be sure, another reason
to use SM may be if the situation approximates natural decision making.
The closest economic analog to our argument in the field may be the drafting of a contract
(Battigalli and Maggi, 2002; Tirole, 1999; Schwartz and Watson, 2004). Contemplation of
all possible contingencies involves SM decision-making, while the actual decision when the
information set is revealed involves DE decision-making. Differences in decision-making pro-
vide another reason, besides incentive compatibility, why agents might not have incentives
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aligned with principals. Legal doctrine has neglected this dimension of contractual capacity.
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
This section presents the online and lab instructions for the experiments.
B.1. Amazon Mechanical Turk
A sample paragraph from the login task is transcribing (not translating) a Tagalog translation of Adam
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations: Kaya sa isip o diwa na tayo ay sa mga ito, excites ilang mga antas ng
parehong damdamin, sa proporsyon ng kasiglahan o dulness ng kuru-kuro. Ang labis na kung saan sila
magbuntis sa kahirapan ng mga wretches nakakaapekto sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga sarili ng
higit pa sa anumang iba pang; dahil sa takot na arises mula sa kathang isip nila kung ano ang kani-kanilang
mga sarili ay magtiis, kung sila ay talagang ang wretches kanino sila ay naghahanap sa, at kung sa partikular
na bahagi sa kanilang mga sarili ay talagang apektado sa parehong miserable paraan. Ang tunay na puwersa
ng mga kuru-kuro na ito ay sapat na, sa kanilang mga masasaktin frame, upang gumawa ng na galis o hindi
mapalagay damdam complained ng.
B.1.1. Ultimatum game instructions (Study 2)
Appendix Figure B.1: Player 1
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Appendix Figure B.2: Player 2 under direct elicitation
Appendix Figure B.3: Player 2 under the strategy method
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B.1.2. Trust game instructions (Study 3)
Appendix Figure B.4: Player 1
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Appendix Figure B.5: Player 2
B.2. Lab Instructions
We present the original German and the English translations by Google; subjects only saw the German
version.




Zu Beginn dieses Experiments sind die Teilnehmer zufällig in 2-er Gruppen aufgeteilt worden. Sie haben
also ein Gegenüber, aber Sie wissen nicht wer es ist und werden es auch nie von uns mittgeteilt bekommen.
Auch Ihrem Gegenüber werden wir Ihre Identität nie mitteilen.
Innerhalb Ihrer 2-er Gruppe gibt es 2 verschiedene Rollen: Vorschlagender und Antwortender. Per Zufall
werden wir Ihre Rolle auf der nächsten Seite zuteilen. Zunächst die Regeln:
In diesem Experiment haben Sie beide zusammen 100 Cent erhalten. Um die Aufteilung dieser 100 Cent
geht es in diesem Experiment. Dabei macht der Vorschlagende dem Antwortenden eine „Take-it-or-Leave-it-
offer“, mit anderen Worten der Vorschlagende macht einen Vorschlag und der Antwortende kann diesen nur
20Emotional Setting 1 is coded as 0 and Emotional Setting 2 is coded as 1 in the data analysis.
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entweder genau so annehmen oder ablehnen. Wenn er ablehnt bekommen beide Teilnehmer 0 Cent.
AUFGABE DES VORSCHLAGENDEN:
Der Vorschlagende schlägt eine Verteilung der 100 Cent vor. Der Vorschlagende hat dabei 11 Möglichkeiten:
1.) 100 Cent für sich, 0 Cent für den Antwortenden. 2.) 90 Cent für sich, 10 Cent für den Antwortenden.
3.) 80 Cent für sich, 20 Cent für den Antwortenden. 4.) 70 Cent für sich, 30 Cent für den Antwortenden.
5.) 60 Cent für sich, 40 Cent für den Antwortenden. 6.) 50 Cent für sich, 50 Cent für den Antwortenden.
7.) 40 Cent für sich, 60 Cent für den Antwortenden. 8.) 30 Cent für sich, 70 Cent für den Antwortenden.
9.) 20 Cent für sich, 80 Cent für den Antwortenden. 10.) 10 Cent für sich, 90 Cent für den Antwortenden.
11.) 0 Cent für sich, 100 Cent für den Antwortenden. Während der Vorschlagende seine Entscheidung
trifft, wartet der Antwortende.
Direct Elicitation
AUFGABE DES ANTWORTENDEN:
Hat der Vorschlagende seine Auswahl getroffen, zeigt der Computer dem Antwortenden den Vorschlag
an. Der Antwortende kann den Vorschlag entweder annehmen oder ablehnen.
ERGEBNISBILDSCHIRM:
Am Schluss sehen beide Teilnehmer einen Ergebnisbildschirm. Hier wird beiden der Vorschlag angezeigt,
und ob dieser angenommen oder abgelehnt wurde.
Strategy Method
AUFGABE DES ANTWORTENDEN:
Während der Vorschlagende seine Entscheidung trifft, entscheidet der Antwortende schon gleichzeitig
welche Vorschläge er annehmen und welche er ablehnen würde. Das heisst für jeden der elf möglichen
Vorschläge instruiert der Antwortende den Computer diesen entweder anzunehmen oder abzulehnen.
ERGEBNISBILDSCHIRM:
Erst wenn beide Teilnehmer ihre beiden Entscheidungen unwiderruflich getroffen haben wird der Com-
puter den Vorschlag gemäss den Instruktionen des Antwortenden annehmen oder ablehnen. Beide sehen dann
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Während der Vorschlagende seine Entscheidung trifft, entscheidet der Antwortende schon gleichzeitig
wieviel er mindestens geboten bekommen muss um anzunehmen. Das heisst er instruiert den Computer
welchen Betrag er mindestens geboten bekommen muss. Alle Vorschläge die ihm weniger bieten wird der
Computer dann ablehnen, alle Vorschläge die ihm mehr bieten wird der Computer dann annehmen.
ERGEBNISBILDSCHIRM:
Erst wenn beide Teilnehmer ihre beiden Entscheidungen unwiderruflich getroffen haben wird der Com-
puter den Vorschlag gemäss den Instruktionen des Antwortenden annehmen oder ablehnen. Beide Teilnehmer
sehen dann einen Ergebnisbildschirm. Hier wird beiden der Vorschlag angezeigt, und ob dieser angenommen
oder abgelehnt wurde.
All
Ferner werden die resultierenden Auszahlungen angezeigt:
Wenn der Antwortende den Vorschlag annimmt: Beide bekommen das Geld genau gemäss dem gemachten
Vorschlag.




Zu Beginn dieses Experiments sind die Teilnehmer zufällig in 2-er Gruppen aufgeteilt worden. Sie haben
also ein Gegenüber, aber Sie wissen nicht wer es ist und werden es auch nie von uns mittgeteilt bekommen.
Auch Ihrem Gegenüber werden wir Ihre Identität nie mitteilen.
Innerhalb Ihrer 2-er Gruppe gibt es 2 verschiedene Rollen: Diktator21 und Untertan. Per Zufall werden
wir Ihre Rolle auf der nächsten Seite zuteilen. Zunächst die Regeln:
In diesem Experiment haben Sie beide zusammen 100 Cent erhalten. Um die Aufteilung dieser 100 Cent
geht es in diesem Experiment. Dabei macht der Diktator dem Untertan eine Take-it-or-Leave-it-offer“, mit
anderen Worten der Vorschlagende macht einen Vorschlag und der Untertan kann diesen nur entweder genau
so annehmen oder ablehnen. Wenn er ablehnt bekommen beide Teilnehmer 0 Cent.
AUFGABE DES Diktator :
Der Diktator schlägt eine Verteilung der 100 Cent vor. Der Diktator hat dabei 11 Möglichkeiten:
1.) 100 Cent für sich, 0 Cent für den Untertan. 2.) 90 Cent für sich, 10 Cent für den Untertan.
21Emphasis is added for the reader to see the difference with emotional setting 1. The subjects did not see
italicized instructions.
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3.) 80 Cent für sich, 20 Cent für den Untertan. 4.) 70 Cent für sich, 30 Cent für den Untertan.
5.) 60 Cent für sich, 40 Cent für den Untertan. 6.) 50 Cent für sich, 50 Cent für den Untertan.
7.) 40 Cent für sich, 60 Cent für den Untertan. 8.) 30 Cent für sich, 70 Cent für den Untertan.
9.) 20 Cent für sich, 80 Cent für den Untertan. 10.) 10 Cent für sich, 90 Cent für den Untertan.
11.) 0 Cent für sich, 100 Cent für den Untertan.
Direct Elicitation
Während der Diktator seine Entscheidung trifft, wartet der Untertan.
AUFGABE DES ANTWORTENDEN:
Hat der Diktator seine Auswahl getroffen, zeigt der Computer dem Untertan den Vorschlag an. Der
Untertan kann den Vorschlag entweder annehmen oder ablehnen.
ERGEBNISBILDSCHIRM:
Hat der Diktator sich für Annahme oder Ablehnung entschieden sehen beide Teilnehmer einen Ergebnis-
bildschirm. Hier wird beiden der Vorschlag angezeigt, und ob dieser angenommen oder abgelehnt wurde.
Strategy Method
AUFGABE DES ANTWORTENDEN:
Während der Diktator seine Entscheidung trifft, entscheidet der Untertan schon gleichzeitig welche
Vorschläge er annehmen und welche er ablehnen würde. Das heisst für jeden der elf möglichen Vorschläge
instruiert der Untertan den Computer diesen entweder anzunehmen oder abzulehnen.
ERGEBNISBILDSCHIRM:
Erst wenn beide Teilnehmer ihre beiden Entscheidungen unwiderruflich getroffen haben wird der Com-
puter den Vorschlag gemäss den Instruktionen des Untertan annehmen oder ablehnen. Beide Teilnehmer




Während der Diktator seine Entscheidung trifft, entscheidet der Untertan schon gleichzeitig wieviel er
mindestens geboten bekommen muss um anzunehmen. Das heisst er instruiert den Computer welchen Betrag
er mindestens geboten bekommen muss. Alle Vorschläge die ihm weniger bieten wird der Computer dann
ablehnen, alle Vorschläge die ihm mehr bieten wird der Computer dann annehmen.
ERGEBNISBILDSCHIRM:
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Erst wenn beide Teilnehmer ihre beiden Entscheidungen unwiderruflich getroffen haben wird der Com-
puter den Vorschlag gemäss den Instruktionen des Untertan annehmen oder ablehnen. Beide Teilnehmer
sehen dann einen Ergebnisbildschirm. Hier wird beiden der Vorschlag angezeigt, und ob dieser angenommen
oder abgelehnt wurde.
All
Ferner werden die resultierenden Auszahlungen angezeigt:
Wenn der Untertan den Vorschlag annimmt: Beide bekommen das Geld genau gemäss dem gemachten
Vorschlag.
Wenn der Untertan den Vorschlag ablehnt: Beide Teilnehmer in der 2-er Gruppe bekommen 0 Cent.




At the beginning of this experiment, the participants were randomly divided into groups of two. So you
have a counterpart, but you do not know who it is and never will get it shared by us. We will never tell your
counterpart about your identity.
Within your 2-person group there are 2 different roles: proposer and responder. By chance, we will assign
your role on the next page. First the rules:
In this experiment, you both received 100 cents together. The distribution of these 100 cents is the topic
of this experiment. In doing so, the proposer makes a "take-it-or-leave-it-offer" to the respondent, in other
words the proposer makes a suggestion and the respondent can only either accept or reject it. If he declines,
both participants get 0 cent.
TASK OF THE PROPOSAL:
The proposer suggests a distribution of 100 cents. The proposer has 11 options:
1) 100 cents for themselves, 0 cents for the respondent. 2.) 90 cents for themselves, 10 cents for the
respondent.
3.) 80 cents for themselves, 20 cents for the respondent. 4.) 70 cents for themselves, 30 cents for the
respondent.
5.) 60 cents for themselves, 40 cents for the respondent. 6.) 50 cents for themselves, 50 cents for the
respondent.
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7.) 40 cents for themselves, 60 cents for the respondent. 8.) 30 cents for themselves, 70 cents for the
respondent.
9.) 20 cents for themselves, 80 cents for the respondent. 10.) 10 cents for themselves, 90 cents for the
respondent.
11.) 0 cents for themselves, 100 cents for the respondent. While the proposer makes his decision, the
respondent waits.
Direct Elicitation
TASK OF THE ANSWER:
When the proposer has made his selection, the computer displays the suggestion to the respondent. The
respondent can either accept or reject the proposal.
RESULTS SCREEN:
At the end, both participants see a result screen. Here both are shown the suggestion and whether it was
accepted or rejected.
Strategy Method
TASK OF THE ANSWER:
While the proposer makes his decision, the respondent decides at the same time what suggestions he
would accept and which he would reject. That is, for each of the eleven possible suggestions, the respondent
instructs the computer to either accept or reject it.
RESULTS SCREEN:
Only when both participants have irrevocably made their two decisions will the computer accept or reject
the proposal according to the respondent’s instructions. Both will see a result screen. Here the proposal is
displayed and whether it has been accepted or rejected.
Threshold Method
TASK OF THE ANSWER:
While the proposer makes his decision, the respondent decides at the same time how much he has to get
at least bid to accept. That means he instructs the computer which amount he has to get at least bid. The
computer then reject any suggestions that will give it less, the computer then will accept any suggestions
that will give it more.
RESULTS SCREEN:
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Only when both participants have irrevocably made their two decisions will the computer accept or reject
the proposal according to the respondent’s instructions. Both participants will see a result screen. Here both
are shown the suggestion and whether it was accepted or rejected.
All
In addition, the resulting payouts are displayed:
If the respondent accepts the proposal: Both get the money exactly according to the proposal made.




At the beginning of this experiment, the participants were randomly divided into groups of two. So you
have a counterpart, but you do not know who it is and never will get it shared by us. We will never tell your
counterpart about your identity.
Within your 2-person group there are 2 different roles: Dictator and Subject. By chance, we will assign
your role on the next page. First the rules:
In this experiment, you both received 100 cents together. The distribution of these 100 cents is the topic
of this experiment. In doing so, the dictator makes the subject a take-it-or-leave-it-offer ", in other words
the proposer makes a suggestion and the subject can only either accept or reject it. If he declines, both
participants get 0 cent.
TASK OF THE DICTATOR:
The dictator proposes a distribution of 100 cents. The dictator has 11 options:
1) 100 cents for themselves, 0 cents for the subject. 2.) 90 cents for themselves, 10 cents for the subject.
3.) 80 cents for themselves, 20 cents for the subject. 4.) 70 cents for themselves, 30 cents for the subject.
5.) 60 cents for themselves, 40 cents for the subject. 6.) 50 cents for himself, 50 cents for the subject.
7.) 40 cents for himself, 60 cents for the subject. 8.) 30 cents for themselves, 70 cents for the subject.
9.) 20 cents for themselves, 80 cents for the subject. 10.) 10 cents for himself, 90 cents for the subject.
11.) 0 cent for themselves, 100 cents for the subject.
Direct Elicitation
While the dictator makes his decision, the subject waits.
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TASK OF THE ANSWER:
Once the dictator has made his selection, the computer displays the proposal to the subject. The subject
can either accept or reject the proposal.
RESULTS SCREEN:
If the dictator has opted for acceptance or rejection, both participants will see a result screen. Here both
are shown the suggestion and whether it was accepted or rejected.
Strategy Method
TASK OF THE ANSWER:
While the dictator makes his decision, the subject decides at the same time which proposals he will accept
and which he would refuse. That is, for each of the eleven possible suggestions, the subject instructs the
computer to either accept or reject it.
RESULTS SCREEN:
Only when both participants have irrevocably taken their two decisions will the computer accept or reject
the proposal according to the subject’s instructions. Both participants will see a result screen. Here both are
shown the suggestion and whether it was accepted or rejected.
Threshold Method
TASK OF THE ANSWER:
While the dictator makes his decision, the subject decides at the same time how much he has to get at
least bid to accept. That means he instructs the computer which amount he has to get at least bid. The
computer then reject any suggestions that will give it less, the computer then will accept any suggestions
that will give it more.
RESULTS SCREEN:
Only when both participants have irrevocably taken their two decisions will the computer accept or reject
the proposal according to the subject’s instructions. Both participants will see a result screen. Here both are
shown the suggestion and whether it was accepted or rejected.
All
In addition, the resulting payouts are displayed:
If the subject accepts the proposal: Both get the money exactly according to the proposal made.
If the subject rejects the proposal: Both participants in the 2-group get 0 cent.
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B.2.3. Three-player prisoner’s dilemma instructions (Study 5)
This section presents screenshots of the experimental instructions. The first set of figures with the purple
background (emotional setting 122) are in the original German. The second set of figures show English
translations by Google Chrome; subjects only saw the German version. The second set of figures use a red
background (emotional setting 2). The other change between emotional setting 1 and 2 is the use of the word
“group” or “team” when describing the game.
22Emotional Setting 1 is coded as 0 and Emotional Setting 2 is coded as 1 in the data analysis.
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Appendix Figure B.6: Instructions for contribution stage of game
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Appendix Figure B.7: Instructions for deduction stage of game
Appendix Figure B.8: Control question
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Appendix Figure B.9: Control question feedback
Appendix Figure B.10: Second control question
Appendix Figure B.11: Contribution decision
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Appendix Figure B.12: Deduction decision 1
Appendix Figure B.13: Deduction decision 2
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Appendix Figure B.14: Deduction decision 3
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Appendix Figure B.15: English Translation
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Appendix Figure B.16: English Translation
